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l/ -FOREWORD 
The Governor's Committee on AdminhJtrative Organization is composed of 
twelve members - - four members of the Colorado Senate, four members of the 
---
of the Colorado House of Representatives and fc.1ur citizen members. Although each 
has hac! a considerable experience in or with the administrative organization and 
functioning of government at the state 1.tvel in C~orado, it was deemed advisable to 
establi,sh a beginning point common to a.11. Furth-el=, in recognition of the previous 
efforts to improve administrative organization in thj.s state, the committee decided 
to have a review made of these effoi--ts a11,d thli:~ accc.>mplishments, And, finally, 
__ ,-
I, 
there was the realization that thro\l.ghout tne country similar committees have 
studied (or are studying) the organizational structures in their own states and that 
some have met with considerable success in bringing about more efficient and econ-
_,., 
omical state gove:,;nment while others have not been so fcrtunate. Thus, the Cclo-
rado committee was anxious to review the procedures and methods utilized by its 
counterpart in those states in which the efforts were fruitful in order to profit from 
their experience, and alsc to inform itself as to why in other states the efforts were 
fruitless---and thus seek to avoid making similar errors in its own undertaking. 
The task of researching the above was accepted by Dr. Leo C, Riethmayer, 
. 
" Chairman of the Department of Political Science and the Graduate Curriculum in 
' _} 
v Public Administration of the University of Colorado in cullaboration with Dr. Laird 
Dunbar, Instructor in Political Science at the University. The Governor's Commit-
tee is, indeed, fortunate to have had two such capable professional men work with 
it in this effort, and the committee wishes to express appreciation to Dr. Rieth-
/' mayer and Di-. Dunbar for their efforts in preparing the report on "Administrative 
Reorganization in Colorado". 






ADMINISTRATIVE REORGANIZATION IN COLORADO 
I. 
THE PRESENT ORGANIZATIONAL PROBLEM 
The general administrative expansion at the state level for the citizens of 
Colorado has resultc.:d in a near-fantastic growth in both the number of services 
offered ·by the state and the number of agencies e~:tabliohed to perform these ser-
vices. In 1950, the Council of State Gc,verntr.ents found that Colorado's administra-
1 / 
tive structure contained nine "m.ajor deparnients" and 131 "independent agencies." 
Since the time of that survey the state has 1:--een engaged in what may be termed 
"piecemeal" reorganization with the result that the 1950 figurts give a ,1ery inac-
curate picture of the present structure. 
In other words, it may b..:.- sai.d that there still exists a vast, sprawling, com-
plicatcd adrninistrative organiz~tti.on, characterized by a bewil<kring multiplicity 
of agencies which ar~. in thc:r ovm turn, marked by an astounding diversity of 
organizational forms and ~.cg!'.;:;es of accoc.ntability. 
The problem viewed soie:y in terms of the :1u:·:1.ber of agencies involv8d is im-
mensc. 
To be added to this factor oI pure nu.T;ber however, are at least three others. 
While in fact these points are E-om"'what inttr:r-el;::i.ted, :hey r..--:.ay be artificially sepa-
rated here for examination. 
In the first place, the governor's limited power in such vital matters as the 
choice of heads of his administrative departments, bucgeting, and fiscal control - -
l / Reorganizing St;c".tc Gov<;;rnn1ent, The Council of State Governments, Chicago, 
1950, p. ll. 
-1-
not to mention actual "command power" - - complicates the general administrative 
situation, Administrative efficiency and effectiveness are so difficult to achieve 
under the optimum organizational conditions, that to complicate the matter further 
,.t, by the possibility of administrative heads of different view - even a different party-
\ 
than the chief executive, is to put the problem in the class of the near.insolubles . 
....;,.. At best,· about the most that can be hoped for i~ that the various department heads 
will see their way clear to follow the le,,d of an energetic governor for the further-




Similarly, the present budget sitl\c?~tion leaves much to be desired both in re-
gard to administrative effoctivenc ss and pcliti'.:al accountabi!ity. Instead of follow-
ing the generally 2-cc-~!pted practice of making the budget office something lik\,; the 
chief staff aid to thE: executive, t!-le present system is one in which the state budget 
officer is "off in a corner" of the hie:tar-:hy ar.d relatively independent of the state's 
chief executive. 
A second problem stemming from the multiplicity of administrative aglc!ncies 
turns not so much on thL fa.;t that there :::.re so 1n2.ny agencies as on the :manner in 
which these agencies arc orga;.1izcd in relc.tion to each other. They are not arr an-
ged in any logical grouping - least of all are they arranged into anything which might 
be said to relate to the function to which they purport to be organized. In other 
words, that administrative concept which students of pt:blic administration have 
come to call "unifunctional organization' 1 2.ppe2.rs to be com.:pktely ignored. 
Completely aside from such $Upposed ad·.,antages as the monetary economies 
which might possibly be dfocted by the removal of the opportunity for wasteful 







i ' I 
"" .. 
• ., 
' .. : 
the full utilization of technical assistance, there remains, over and above these, 
a most important benefit of unifunctional organization. Lines of authority and 
accountability between the executive and the administrative agencies arE; clarified 
at the expense of such expendables as "buck-passing" and th<c! n:yriad other forms 
of political and administrative accountability. T~1e citiz;;;.a can more easily deter-
mine the ·weak links in th(; unifunctional form of organiz:::ttion than he can in th<:! 
heterogenous pot-pourri that is now :rresented hirn. And he can mor::; ir:telligcntly 
take remedial .:..ction :J.t the pclls . 
It should be pointed out that dirrim:.tio!1 of dupEcation may or may not effect 
savings in the taxp2.ye!'S I rnon,~y, so fa.r r.s the tctal amot;.nt is concerned. It ::.s 
reasor.able to expect, h::iwGve:: tr.at more service :.)er unit of mor:.ey sp(.;nt would be 
attainr~d by organiz,1ing along lin<~s rel:ited to the function.., performed. 
A third factor, 2.pnrt £ror:1 sh!c!1c:r number of agencies in•_rolved, is the absence 
of adequate ovtrall staff ar.:.d 2.ux:ilia.:-y agencies. It seems reasonable to presume 
that some 0£ the morr; gross ef1'ccts of such a k.rga number of agencies could be 
mitigated if the governor ::odd ha-.re cufficient assist.:mce to keep track of them- -
enough assistance to permit hirr1 to be "in more: places at the sar.1e time. 11 
The con1plexities of modern government 2.re such that it is a physical impos-
.. , sibility for a goverr._or tc;perform adecpately th~ constitutionally assigned task of 
wielding the "supr.~me executive authority" 8.S weE as the ceremonial, social and 
political chores which also fall within his purview. It might evt;n be sc:.id without 
irony that th~~ present aciministrative organization rr:_ak;cs even the adequate fulfill-
ment of the administrative !'espo:1.sibility alone impossible. 
An overall general staff agency could pro•:idc, (.:;Ven under the present organi-
. ,....:. 
zation, means by which th~ state 1s chief executive officer co;ild, at least, obtain 
• -3-
--
the information upon which he could base such administrative changes as he is able 
to make, as well as a rudimentary machinery for keeping the administrative de-
partments and agencies responsible, 
A "cabinet", it should be added does not meet the need h~re. Its functions 
lie at what might be called the policy level, and it is naive to assume that depart-
m(.:nt heads whose legal duties are full time can furnish the governor with the pre-
cise and detailed information needeq whe:i. they themselves are without the proper 
"arms of management"- administrative research aides, personnel officers, and 
r:, fiscal and budgeting ascistants. 




LEAST FOUR FACE TS: THERE IS AN EXCESSIVE NUMBER OF AGENCIES: THE 
POWER OF THE GOVERNOR TO CONTROL EVEN A LESSER NUMBER IS INADE-
QUATE: THE AGENCIES ARE NOT SO ORGANIZED AS TO BENEFIT FROM THE 
PERFORMANCE OF SIMILAR FUNG TIONS; THE GOVERNOR DOES NOT HA VE THE 
AID THAT HE NEEDS TO FURNISH HH,1 THE NECESSARY INFORMATION AND 
ADVICE HE WOULD NEED TO PERFORM HIS CONSTITUTIONAL TASK - IF HE 
HAD THE POWER TO DO SO. 
THE SUM IS AN ORGANIZATIONAL PROBLEM OF NO MEAN PROPORTIONS--
ONE WHICH THE CITIZENS OF THE STATE, 1,.CTING THROUGH THEIR REPRE-
SENTATIVE AND PRIVATE GROUPS TO WHICH THEY BELONG, HAVE FROM 
TIME TO TIME TRIED TO CORRECT. THE RE3ULT OF THESE EFFORTS HAS 
BEEN GOOD. WHILE THERE IS MUCH TO DO, WE MUST REMEMBER THAT 














DEVELOPMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION 
IN COLORADO. 
In the years since Colorad.o joined the Union in the Centennial year of 1876, 
the state has maintained a steady growth in population, The census of 1880 gave the 
state a total of 194,327 persons. By the year 1930, there were mere than a mil-
lion persons in Colorado and the 1950 figures were i, 325,089. The estimated pop-
ulation in July cf 1953 was I, 456,000 - - an increase of nearly lOo/o since the last 
official census, While most estimates give a somewhat low<;;r figure, it is not com-
pletely in the realm of fantasy to suggest that by around 1960, the state's p---pulation 
will have increased ten-fold since cbt aining statehood. In 1953, only six states 
1/ 
were increasing their population nt a foster r.:itc than Cokrado. 
Like the naticn, Colorado is growing, and increased popul:i.tion inevitably 
leads to increased neec fc-r administrative services and facilities. 
The administrative services rendered by the state of Colorad-:.; have expanded, 
as have the services cf other sti'..tes, in c.irdcr te; meet the demands cf t:1c state's 
citizens. As is also true in case of the cth<.; r states, this 1:;;xpansicn has been in 
three general diro.:.;cticns - or, it might be said, for three different re2.sons. In the 
first place, the state h2.s· expanded servic--~s which it has always performed; second-
ly, the state has responded to the needs cf its citizens by und.:::rtaking completely 
new services; and, thirdly, the stat0 h.:.s ta.lc•~n ever, er perhaps, merely insisted -..--
upon supervising, services which were being performed by the various units of 
1/ Current Population Repc:-ts, Series P--25, No. 89 {Bureau of the Census, 





For an example of the first type of expansion, one need only look to such 
fields a'f Jligher education, and the care of the mentally ill. The creation of var-
ious specialized schools through out the state is an exar..-Lple of the case in point -
schools of education, mining, and agriculture - and the very current example of 
changes in the status of the Fort Lewis school is quite pertinent. Similarly, the 
old "insane asylum 11 is, happily, no longer considered adequate in the light of ad-
vancement in the fields of diagnosis and treatment of the mentally ill, and as a 
result this field of state service ha.s been forced to expand. 
Colorado is particularly rich in examples of the second type of administrative 
growth. The publicizing and promotion. of the state's abundant recreational re-
sources is an excellent case in point. Colorado's citizens have come to realize 
the economic potential of their natvral resources and their elected representatives 
-: have responded with such service's as conservation progra,ms, fish and game 
stocking activities, and pro1notion2J services designed to inform both residents and 
others of the extent of these services. 
It is in the third type of growth that one iinds the most sensational administra-
ti ve expansion. The phenomena of the state, whether entirely taking over a speci-
fie function, or of insisting on so1ne degree cf control over the local units that 
!:)erform the service, are universal thrcugha.t the fi-.::ld of sta.te ad1nir.istration. The 
~xample of highways leaps to mind. For decades road b1,1ilding and maintenance 
' ·, 
• -iad been viewed as a purely local function. V/ith stimulus from the federal govern-
nent in the form of grants-in-aid, the states entered the highway field with a ven-
~cance. Each year sees this activity becorn.e more and more an example of the 
:._"-













and the toll-road movements seem to ha,.ve yet to reach their maximum point of 
adoption. 
The fields of public welfare and relief for the needy provide still other ex-
amples of the state adopting responsibility for services previously considered to 
be pre-eminently local in character. So also, for that matter, does the adminis-
tration of elementary and secondary education. State departments of education are 
today exercising a degree; of control of local school systems which would have 
been thought to be impossible a generation ago. 
And so state administration has grown in response to the needs of the times 
as expressed by the demands of the citizens of the state. Colorado has had, one 
may suppose, neither more nor less demand, generally speaking, than the other 
states. The proliferation of state agencies that one now finds would certainly in-
dicate that, at least, the demand in Colorado has not been less than it was else-------
where . 
The way of meeting these demands secrn.s, again, to have been no different 
in Colorado than it was in the other states. Agencies were created by the legisla-
tu.re and "tacked on, " as it were, to the existing adn-dnistrative structure. Some 
of these agencies were placed uncler sir,gle heads; others were placed in the hands 
of boards or commissions. Son-ie of the agency hC;acis were to be appointed by the 
governor; sometimes with the consent cf the Senate, so~nctin1es not, Some of the 
new agencies were placed in existing department ~ ~ctually or merely "en paper" 
while others were given a status rc::.nging from what or.e might call "sem.i-indepen-
i.ent" to one which is obviously free of~.::;Y_ effective executive controls. 









and the duties assigned these boards frequently merit a form of organization that 
grants a degree of authority more commensurate with the magnitude of the activity 
than can be mustered by a bc,ara composed of officials with other full-time obliga-
ticns . 
Functions that in any logical arrangem~nt could be expected to be given, at 
the very least, some formal machinery for coordination were left to go their com-
paratively independent ways. 
On the personnel side, sound practices such as position-classification and 
in-service training programs have been slow to find root in Colorado administra-
tion, in spite of a constitutio_nal provision for the merit system dating back to 1918. 
Other practices which have been ignored include the establishment of a positive 
and vigorous recruiting system to draw capable young people into the service of the 
state. On the matter of finance and budgeting, the picture is no better - the state 
still lacks a budget organization that can operate as an effective staff aid to the 
chief executive. 
The resulting situation in Colorado, as in most of the States of the Union, is 
an administrative structure which, although created to fulfill the expressed wishes 
of the citizenry, may actually impair the effective answering of the citizens' de-
mands. 
In other words, the problem cf meeting th0 political demands of the times has 






~ . . 
III 
A REVIEW OF :PROPOSED AND ACCOMPLISHED 
REORGANIZATION IN COLORADO 
The legislators and the citizens of the state of Colorado have not been unaware. 
of the need of reorganizing the administrative structure a£ the state's government, 
and from time to time - with increasing frequency in recent years - have under-
taken the task of doing something about it. Their dforts have met with varying 
degrees of success. 
1/-
The legislative session of 1915 passed an act, establishing a committee 
authorized to conduct a survey cf the state's governmental structure with an eye to 
securing increased efficiency and reduced C;Xpenditures. Composed of two Senators, 
two Representatives, and three non-legislators appointed by the governor, this 
Survey C ummittee on State Affairs submitted its Report in February of 1917. The 
repcrt was actually 18 separate reports on various offices and functions of the 
state governmental organization, In the main, it recommended integrating the ad-
ministrative agencies of tht: state under the governor, and it proposed a budget 
system. A budget device was adcptcd in 19 i 9 - although one not bearing much re-
semblance to that recom1n~ndcd - but no action was taken on any of the other pro-
posals. 
In 1922, after having successfully campaigned for, but not yet having assumed 
the office of, governor, William E. Sweet obtained the services of two members of 
the staff of the New York Bureau of Municipal Research tc undertake a study of 
Colorado state organizational arrangements and to make recommendations for such 
,~' consolidation as seio·.mccl necessary. The report, submitted to the legislature in 
the form of a speech by the govenor, prcpcsed a far-reaching reorganization. 







All administrative agencies were to be consolidated, as far as was permitted 
by the constitution, into nine departments, each of which was to be headed by a 
person appointed by the governor and subject also to removal by him. Some seven-
ty bureaus and commissions were to be • (;liminati;d or reconstituted. The: heads of 
the nine,departments (Finance, TaXi!.tion, Agriculture, Mines, Labor, Trade and 
Commerce, Public Works, Public Welfare, and Public Health) were to act as a 
"cabinet" for the governor. The authors of the rcpurt estimated that adoption cf 
the re0rganizaticn plan would lead to savings of about a h2.lf-milliein dollars annually 
The chief result of the plan ~-f Governor Sweet was the introduction of a coun-
ter-plan, knc.,wn as the L"-mbert Bill, which provided for some degree cf ccnsolida-
tion. There was to be a seven man administrative cabinet, the members of which 
were to be ekcted by the people. The Lambert plan might best be described as 
something closely akin tc the type cf government foupd in commission gcverned 
cities . 
In the legislative battle which ensue:;cl, neither p lan survived to become law. 
In 1932, Ed. C. Johnson successfully campaigned for the governorship on a 
platform which incluc.ecl recrganization of the stat~' s gcvernmcntal structure. Upon 
, election, he appointed a committee, which was to be headed by ex-Governor Sweet, 
and gave it the task of presenting a reorganiz2.tic.n plan. 
The result was an ad1ninistrativc cede bill which attempted tc do as much re-
crganization as was statutorily pos sibfo. In acditiun the c::;mmittee proposed two 
amendments to the constitution. These n.:visions cf the ccnstituticn would have 
., provided for a short ballot, on which cnly the governor, the lieutenant governor 
and the auditor would be elected - 12 department heads were tc be appuintcd - and 








acceptable to the citizens of the state. The code bill had more succcs s. 
Some twenty-five boards and commissions were transferred to six adminis-
trative departments. These departments were headed by elective officals as shown 
below. 
Executive Department 
Department of Finance 
and Taxation 
Department cf Auditing 
Department cf Law 
Department cf State 





Secretary of State 
Superintendent of Public 
Instruction 
These department heads, with tht exepticn of the Superintendent cf Public 
Instruction, were also t-::· serve as members of the executive council. This council 
was divided into three divisions - budget, acccunts and control, and purchasing -
with the result that the great bulk of the control of the state's fiscal matters rested 
with this executive council. The various clivisicns passed on the governor's budget, 
reviewed practically all of the state 1s purchases, and established the accounting 
procedures fur all state units. 
It should be notc;d that here again is s omcthing very closely resembling a com 
mission form of government - one in which executive responsibility is very poorly 
concentrated, and one in which a large number of agencies were merely 11 att2.ched 11 
to one of the six administrative dcpartmer.ts. Under this reorganization it was 
nearly impossible for the elective department heads to exercise anything more 











By 1937, the inherent defects of the 1933 administrative reorganization were 
becoming quite apparent, and it was widely agreed that the admitted "transitional" 
features of the earlier revision needed either bolstering er, perhaps, even more 
extensive changes. 
As a re::sult of these sentiments, the nationally known firm of Griffcnhagen 
and Associates was engaged to undertake a comprehensive survey of the state's 
administrative organization. 
The resulting survey was probably the most comprehensive study of Colorado 
government that has ever been com piled. The report was in 22 parts, each of 
which dealt with one major administrative office or function. Each report included 
an anlysis of the various agencies involved, as well as a critical appraisal of their 
functions, organization, staff and finn.ncial requirements, and procedures in addi-
tion to rec-.)mmendaticns for improvement. 
The proposed reorganization of the executive branch may be summa rizcd 
under six major headings. 
1. Short ballot. Oniy thL: governcr was to be elected. All other officers 
were to be appointed by him - with the sole exception of the state auditor, 
who was to be an appointee of the legislature. 
2. Centralized Executive Authority and Responsibility. The governor was 
to have compkte pcwer over , and full !'esponsibility for, th<.; administra-
tive operations cf the state. He was t,_) ch,_)ose his major assistants, who 
were in turn to choose their aids under civil service standards and regu-
lations. 
3. Unifuncticnal Departments. The plan prcpcscd about twenty depart-
ments, to be crg2.nized on th(:: basis of some fundam<.;ntal function of state 
government; c. g. , education, health, welfare or highways. Closely re-
lated activities would be organized into divisions, headed by persons ap-
pointed by and responsibl,c; to the department head. 
4. Abulition of Independent and Semi-Incl,~pendent Agencies. There is 








responsible head, and thL: whole proposed plan of departmentalization 
depended upon the abolition of agencies fre:c of such control, and the 
transferring of their {unctions to one of the departments. 
5. The Principle of Single Responsibility. Division of authcrity was to 
be avoided by never employing beards to }'><irform duties which were ad-
ministrative in nature, Thosz boards for which the plan did provide: 
wer,e to operate in a purely advisc,ry capacity. 
6. Establishment of an Acvisory Cnbinet. The heads -:-A the various de-
partments were also to act as the members of the governor's cabinet. 
This cabinet was to be a c-::;ordin:iting body, designed tc prevent cluplica-
tiun and overlapping of duties, and it was also to serve as a source of 
administrative information for the governor. 
Although for the purposes here the Griffenhagen plan for reorganization of 
the state's fiscal administrative facilities is presentec: under a separate heading, 
the plan was actually part of the overall attempt to make the operations of the whole 
executive branch more E:ffective. This was to be achieved by giving the governor 
both control cf, and responsibility for, the expenditures of appropriated funds. The 
fiscal plan may be summarized under two main pcints. 
1. Department of Finance. The Department of Finance was to ( 1), 
operate as the governor's financial staff agency and (2) be the sole 
control unit for the state's fiscal operations. The department was 
to have five divisions - tax collection being left to a separate depart-
1nent. The divisions were to be: 
1. General Supervision and Control. 
2. Budgeting. 
3. Pre-Auditing . 
4. Control of Receivables. 
5. Purchasing anc1 Prc,perty Control. 
2.. Independent Auditor. This official was t::, be appointed by the 
legislature and his functicn is to be rigidly limited to that of post-
auditing. 
The only action cf a reorganizationa! nature undertaken by the 1939 legisla.-
tive session was to amend tht prcviskns concerning the Bu,Jget and Efficiency Com-






be appointed by the governor, he no longer was to serve at the pleasure of the 
chief executive. 
In the two year period from the time of the Griffenhagen report to the meet-
ing of the 1941 legislative session, vo.rious civic groups kept warm the idea of re-
organization. The result was the Administrative Code of 1941. 
This act created seven administrative depart:ments: 
1. Executive Department. 
2. Department of the TrC::asury. 
3. Department of Ta:ication and Re venue. 
4. Dcp;irtment of Auditing. 
5, Department of Law. 
6. Department of Education. 
7. D<,;partmcnt of St ate. 
Each of these dcpartm~nts was organized into divisions, e.g., 18 in the 
Executive Department, 4 in the Law Department, and 6 in Education. In the Exe-
cutive Department was placed a Division of Budgets, the duties of which included 
the preparation of the state budeet for each fiscal year of the coming two-year ap-
propriation period, the recommendation cf inter-agency transfers of funds between 
appropriations, as well as the examination and approval of work programs and 
quarterly allotments of the various clep2.rtments. The head of the division, the 
State Budget and Efficiency Commissioner, was given the task of preventing duplica..;, 
tion of work and function, in addition to being given the power of revising the budget 
estimates of administrative agencies. It might be noted here that the functions of 
this office arc absorbed into th~ Divisicn cf Accounts and Cantrol in the: 1947 fiscal 
reorganim.tion. 
In some of the departments, the reorganization prcvidccl for the use cf boards 
instead of divisions. For example, the Department cf Education contained th(; 










placed in the Department of State, was to control the licensing activities of 19 
boards. Included were the boards of C osmetclogy, Pharmacy, Shorthand Repor-
ters, and Medical Examiners - as woll as the Sta.te Boxing Commission. 
The numerous divisions of the Executive Department were given control 
over still ether boards and con,missions. Fer instance, in the Division of Conser-
vation, the reorganization plan provided for the inclusion of three ccmmis sions, 
dlit; l,~;rc:l., and, surprisingly enough one "department. " 
The code also provide,:l for the establishment of a Governor's Council, which 
was to be composed c,.f the Secretary of State, the Treasurer, the Directer of 
Revenue, the head of the Department cf Education, the Attorney General, the Bud-
get Commissioner, the State Purchasing -·A~nt, plus such other administrative 
officers as the governor might care to chuose. 
The reorganization cf 1941 must be realistically viewed as a "paper" reor-
ganization. Many agencies we:::-c either left independent of the executive authority, 
or were placed under the governor's control in a ncmi?1al sense only. An example 
of the superficiality of the rec,rganization is to be found in the Division c,f Regis -
tration of the Departrr.ent c.,f State. This division - for which no head was prc,vided, 
incidentally, - was composed cf tht beards in charge of th1.;; licensing of occupations. 
Although in the Department of St<J.te, the contrcl of the head of that dt:partment, the 
S_crctary of State, over these boarlls is, 2.t best, to be described as "ncminal". 
A more realistic tenn would be "non-existent." Even omitting such a considera-
tion as this, there still remained the fact that it is excetdingly difficult to maintain 
the constitutional premise that the gcverncr shall exercise the "supreme executive 
power of the State, " in view cf the fact that the bulk uf the members of his Council 










Nonetheless, the ii..dministrative Code of 1941 marks the end, fo1· the time 
bjiWg, at least, d the overall approach to state reorganization in Colorado. From 
1941 until the present, the probbm has been given a piecemeal treatment. 
The first step in this directiot\ was taken in 1946, when the Jub-Com.mittee 
on Health of the Post-War Planning Commission, rccommend.;;cl that the Division of 
Public Health be replaced by a Department of PubHc Health. This department was 
to consist of two divisions; the State Board of Health, and a Division of AdministratioJ 
The Board was to have nin(; governor.appointed members. who we:re in turn to ap-
point the State Director cf Health to head the Division of Administration . 
The duties of the Board of Health, acting through the Division of Administra-
tion were to exercise control of sanitary standards of drinking water. irrigation 
water used in market gardens, the treatment and disposal of sewage and trade waste 
material, the inspection of dairy products. and to act as the state's dissemination 
center for public health information. 
In March of 194 7, Governor Knous signed a bill which abolished the office of 
Budget and Efficiency Commissioner of 1941. and placed the fiscal administration of 
the state in the hancls cf a Controller, who was to head the newly created Division of 
Accounts and Control.- Thio Controller was to be .appointed under civil service regu-
lations and was tq be acc;ountablc to the governor, This fiscal reorganization had 5 
purposes~ . 
1. To provide a budget system through which tht: governor could 
intelligently forecast the needs and resources of the state for the 
corning appropriation period. 
2. To provide continuous budgetary ·Cl:Jntrol !or the fund already 
appropriated by the legislature. 
3. To provide COlltinuous budgetary appraisal-of operating costs-




4. To provide tighter internal control of expenditures as a ::::afe-
guard against both mismanagement and misappropriation of funds. 
5. To provide an adequate record system by m(;ans of which the 
other purposes of the act could be eUec..taaated. 
The Accounting Section of the new Division was given the responsibility for 
reorganizing the state's accounting procedureo. 
During th<:! same session, the Colorado Legiolature created a tcmporaty ag-
ency, called the Committee on R1:.organization. This committee consisted of 7 
members of the legislature chosen on the following basis: majority party - two 
;_,enators and three Representatives; minority party --on~ member from each house. 
The committee was charged with studying the structure of the state's govern-
ment, with the preparation of drafts of such constitutional amendments, statutes, 
or executive orders a~ might be necessary to give effect to their recomrnendati ons. 
The committee reported on Jam~ary 20, 1949. The major results of the 
study, from the standpoint of administration, ..m~ be best summarized by classify-
ing them under the type of action which was neces:::;ary to cive them legal existence. 
A. Requiring S:onstitutional Amendment. 
1. Article XII, Section 13. 
a.. Use of the "rule of three" instead of requiring 
~ appointment of the candidate with highest grade. 
-·.,,.. 
b. Exclusion of members of boards, commissions, 
and other mult-hcaded bodies from the civil service, 
irrespective of whether they arc paid. 
c;:. Exclusion of such administrative department heads 
from the civil service as the General Assembly deems 
necessary. 
d. Creation of a Department of Personnel, with a Direc-
tor choGen under civil service regulations, and subject 
to removal, for cause, by the unanimous vote of the three 








2. Article IV, -Section 1. 
a. The Provision of 4 .. year terms for the Governor, 
Lieutenant-Governor, Secretary of State, Auditor, 
Treasurer, and Attorney General. 
B. Requiring Statutory Enactment. 
1. Clarification o{ terminology to make the ascending order 
of units read, "division, 11 "department," "branch. 11 The term 
"agency" was to be reserved for any other part of the execu-
tive branch crec:ted by law. 
2. Creation of a Division of Publications and Publicity in the 
Executive Department. 
3. Creation of a Division of Personnel in the Executive De-
partment. 
4. Creation of a Department of Agriculture. 
5. A reorganization of the Education Department. 
C. Requiring Executive Order. 
1. Granting foe Director of Revenue the power to establish 
the collecti(m procedures for all agencies empowered to make 
initial i~ollecticns. 
The 1949 session of the state kgislature responded to these recommendations 
with two major actions. 
First, a Department of Agriculture was created tc administer most of th<:: 
laws relating to agriculture. An 3-man State Agricultural Commission was estab-
lished, and its members were to be appointed by the governor - two each from 
congressional districts, and one at large frcm each major party. The Commission 
was to act as a policy-determining and qnasi-:u<licial bcdy, as well as to b~ the 
body which was to recommend t0 the governor, for his appointment, the person to 





The same lt::gislature created as State Board of Stock Inspection Commis-
sicners to succeed an old board with similar cuties. This new Board was indepen -
"\ dent for all intents and purposes from thc.c: D..-::partment of Agriculture and technically 
.... 
placed in the Executive Department. In other words, the reorganization did not com-
pletely integrate all of the state's agricultural functions. 
The other major action stemming from the recornmendations was the reorgan-
ization of the Department cf Education. A ccnstituticnal amendment was proposed -
and adopted - which established a non-salaried Board of Education, which was to be 
elected on a geographical basis, from cungrcs sional districts, and one at large if the 
number of districts was an even number. This Board was to appoint a Cummissioner 
of Education, who was specifically excluded from the classified civil service of the 
state, and who serves at the pleasure of the Board. The Commissioner serves as 
the administrative and executive head of the Department of Education and acts as 
"· secretary for the Board. 
·•· 
The legislature in 1951, created the State Department of Public Institutions, 
which was tc be headed by the governor. A three-man Public Institution Adviscry 
Board, serving without salary and to be appointed by the governor with the consent 
cf the Senate, was to assist the governor. 
The Department was to be administered by a Directur 0f Public Institutiuns, 
appointed by the governor and serving as one vf his cc,nf:id(:ntial emplc,yees and at 
his pleasure. The other en1pkyees of the depn.rtrr,ent were placed under the state's 
\ civil service regulations. 
The general result of the act was to bring under the control and management 
of one agency, the state penal institutiuns as well as such ether crganizations as the 








ors Hc,me, and the Bureau of Child and Animal Protection. The advantages of this 
"consolidation" were dubious as most of the instit11ticns included were still primar-
ily administered through boards for each s<:iparate institution and the mere process 
I 
of adding another department title docs not autcmatically yield efficient administra-
tion. 
The same 1951 legislature amended the provisions ccncerning the Division of 
Accounts and Control to provide fer an annual budget and appropriations system. Tht_ 
reasons for this change was to bring the appropriations system into line with the re-
quirements of a new ccnstitutional arnen<lmcnt which provides fer annual sessions of 
the legislature. Nothing was done, however, tc make the division - or its head, the 
Ccntroller - into anything like a r..:al staff aid to the chi.::£ executive. 
The 1952 session ,::Jf the legislature set up a remodeled State Department of 
Highways, consisting of a State Highway Commission and a Chief Engineer. The 
commission was to be m.acle up of eight members, all resic~ents of a prescribed dis -
trict, to be chosen for staggered terms by the governor and removable by him for 
cause. The commission was t0 choose the Chief Engineer who was tei serve as the 
chief administrative head of the department. 
ThE: samt: act proclaimed that thc.:re were now ten administrative departments 











Executive ~ partmcnt. 
Departn1ent cf 1 reasury. 
Department of Taxation and Revenue. 
Department d Auditing. 
Department cf Law. 
Department vf Education. 
Department of State. 
Department d Public Health. 
Department of Ag:.:i culture. 










Such an administrative structure as this could, conceivably, furnish the 
state with a well-integrated and :t,~sponsible machinery for handling public business. 
But, as even the cursury review of reor~nization which has been presented here 
would indicate, these ten departments are not exactly what they wcul<l seem to be. 
Under the Department of Agriculture, {c:,r instance, one would expect to find the 
State Veterinarian, but he is appointed by the Board cf Stuck Inspection Commissio~ 
ers, themselves independent of the agriculture department. The School for the Deaf 
and the Blind is not in either the Educaticn Department er the Department of Public 
Institutions. The Division of Registration contains 19 boards and 1 commission, but 
there is no head for tht: division, There is even one headless department, Taxation 
and Revenue. Thus, many activities that should be under the control of a department 
are left in the hands of beards er commissi::::,ns either free of control or placed in 
what has come to be the administrative catch-all - the Executive Department. 
Reorganization movements in the past have helped the administrative prob-
lems of the state, but they have by no me;ans cured them - much remains to be done . 
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THE STATE ADMINISTRATIVE REORGANIZATION 
MOVEMENT THROUGHOUT 
THE UNITED STATES 
It appears that the first concerted effort tc, reorganize the administrative 
structure of a state was an unsuccessiul citizens I committ0e attempt in the state of 
Oreg en in the year 1909. Since that first unfortunate endeavc:,r, similar moves have 
been made in every state of the Union - ~s well, of course, as in the national govern-
ment. By 1950, there had been thirty-twc rc,ally significant state reorganizaticns -
1/ 
although in a fow cases indivic.1.ual statu; had undergcn:e the pr~cess twice. 
Generally speaking, these reorganizations were conducte2 0n the basis cf a 
fairly well-established and rather widely accepted set (_;f working hypotheses. 
Thes~ have been well surnmec-up in The Council of State Governments' Re-
organizing State Governments. 
"In our democratic society an executive branch should be 
organized with tw;:; main cbjectivcs: First, it should perform 
with maxiinum \.!ffectivcncss and effichmcy the tasks laid before 
it. Second, it should be p8litically responsible, in practice as 
well as in the0ry. 11 
To make such a governme!1t ideal a reality, administrative reorganization 
2/ 
should proceed along the following lines. 
1. Consolidate all administrative agencies intc a relatively small num-
ber of unifunctit..nal ckpartrnents. 
2. Establish clear lines of authcrity from thl: governcr through the 
rest cf the hi+::rarchy. This may be helped by: 
1 / Reorganizing State Gcvernment. {Th<:! Council of State Governments, Chicago, 
1950), p. 12. 






a. Using the short ballot. 
b. Giving the governor the power tc appoint a.nd remove the 
heads of administrative departments. 
c. Implementing the usual state constitutions'-= pruvision for 
the gcvcrne,r to have "supreme executive power" with such 
specific <leleg<ltions as the power tc require repcrts and to 
order investigations. 
3. Give the governor adequate staff assistance. This wc,uld, in most 
cases, normally include: 
a. a personal office staff with adequate personnel. 
b. a working cabinet cf department heads actually responsible 
to the chief executive. 
c. a central hue.get cfficcr, with the necessary power to pre-
pare an executive budget. 
d. a central accounting systcn, with a.uthvrity to prescribe the 
methcd, 2'.llccate funds, pr\::-audit expenditures, and make fin-
al settlements. 
c. a central pers::innel unit tc link 2. sc:und merit system with 
the executive officer for purp0ses of co0rdination. 
£. a central purchasing agency. 
g. a planning agency for research, evaluation of programs, a 
and anticipation of trends and future needs. 
4. The eli1nination, so far as is possible, cf the use of boards, and 
comn1issions, Operating agencies should be place cl under a single res-
ponsible head. If there arc any really significant quasi-kgislativc or 
judicial functicns, a beard may be justified, but unly then. 
5. An auditor independent of the gc,vcrncr, with the scle function cf 
performing the pest-audit and rcpcrting it to the legisktor. 
The Council of State Gcvcrnments gees on to say that, 
"These principles and others c'.erived from them have been 
applied rather consistently by the practitioners of administrative 
reorganization. These were reiterated by the President's Com-
mittee on Administrative Management in 1937 and confirmed and 
exp2.ndec1 by the Comr.1issicn en the Organization of the Executive 




have supplied the framewcrk for me;s t of the recent reports and 
recommendations by committees studying the problems of state 
government crganizaticns." '}._/ 
It should not be assumed that these concepts are infallible commands to 
.. , groups undertaking administrative rccrganization. N::,,r should it be assumed that 
there is universal agreement upon the validity - or practicality, for that matter -
' .,. 
of all of these hypotheses. It must be conceded, however, that as working as sump-
tions they have led to successful reorganization at all levels cf American gc,vern-
:nent, from towns and villages to the government cf the nation. 
At the state level, which ccncerns us here, the record has, on the whole, 
' 
>een promising, especially in the post war years. As cf 1953, thirty states had un-
\. 
1.ertaken post-war 2 .. Gministrative surveys of ~,arying breadth and depth. In a review 
' 
.,,.: 
::1ade in 1952, Karl Boswcrth, cf the University of Connecticutt, found that twenty-
our of these states had hac1. a chance ta consider reorganization repc•rts, while sur-
4/ 
·eys were still in progress in the remaining six. 
Of the two dozen which had been given reports, nine states either rejected 
hem entirely or adopted so little uf them that the general response must be classi-








he proposals were adopted by the legislature. In the remaining thirteen, a crudely 
•eighted scale showed ad0pticn of from, roughly, 30- -50% of the suggested changes. 
While it seems pointless here to go intv a point~by-pcint review cf the recom-
tlmdations made, and the changes adopted, in the various states, it might be perti-
:nt to ask the question, 11 Why weren 1t these att(;mpts mere successful? 11 For the 
.ucity cf results achieved by rcorganizc:.ticnal surveys in the various states raises 
,me delicate questions concerning the entire questicn of administrative recrganiza-
'
1
/ .Ibid,- page 5. 
'T"f Karl A. -Bosworth, "The Politics of Management Improvements in the States, 11 
:, . ~ .. . 1 . ' . . ' ;;, .
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derations for success in accomplishing the reorganization of the administrative faci-
lities of a state. 
In.the first place, it is quickly seen that neither the need for reorganization, 
nor the excellence cf the suggested changes, seem to have any relation to success of 
the reorganization plan. In other words, the reorganizer quickly finds that legisla-
tive bodies are usually not as eager f:)r far-reaching recrganization as he and his 
colleagues are. When these basic facts of life become clear, the reorganizer, all 
too often, raises the pl~intive cry, "Politics! 11 shrugs his shoulders and believes 
that he has hit upon an acceptable excuse. 
The actual truth of the matter seems to be that the reorganizer, in order to 
do his job well, must alsc face the hard fact that the rcalizatic,n of reorganization 
is more a 11political11 business, than it is an 11 2.dministrativ~" or "scientific" process. 
After facing the fact he must make his cverall pl.ans account for it. 
It is exceec.ingly difficult, of course, to outline in detail th".: necessary steps 
which must be taken in order to insure the fruition of a sound reorganization scheme-
such a plan must be different in 6fferent states, fer instance. It does seem possi-
ble, however, to indicate several factors which must be taken into consideration in 
5/ 
attempting to bring a reorganization plan to the statute bocks. 
To begin with, it is obvious that one cannot afford to ignore the fact that the 
existing institutions represent something cf a balance cf power between organiza-
ticns which are closely akin to vesttd interest. Therefore, the reorganizer should 
,' 5/ The organizaticnal scheme as well as much c-f the material of what follows is 




actually c:xpect - at the very least,re,.sh~::culd net be surprised by - a negative re .. , 








to the executive branch of the government, cme n1ust remember that individual mem-
bers of the legislature may have a very i-t:al ,itake in cn0 er more of the departments 
and agencies tc be reorganized. These departments may handle matters of special 
interest to the legislators' constituents, or, it is possible, may be staffed with per-
sonnel in whom the legislator has personal interest. In any event, the reorganizer 
has no right to expect his plans to receive an open-handed legislative welcome. 
Secondly, the reorganizer cannot afford the luxury of ignoring the general 
temper of the times. Bosworth reaches the setmingly scund conclusicn, that, 
"When horizons are low because of despair-., it is easy to reason 
that any change is unlikely to wcrsen conditi(;ms and may improve them 
(e.g., Nebraska's shift to unicameralism and ether depression changes 
in important state policy). When horizcns are wide with general optim-
ism, the risks.of c.ny change seem lessened (c. g., the many changes in 
the period from the late 1890s tc Wcrld War I. 11 f_:_,/ 
Using these two prepositions as general assumpticns concerning what might 
be called the environment cf reorganizati-:m, the discussion can then continue under 
six majcr headings given by Bosworth. 
I. The Relation of Reorgn.nizz.ticnal Motives and Probable Su cress. 
II. Sponsorship and Success. 
III. Composition and Organizaticn cf the R~organizing Ccmmissi on. 
IV. Organization, Scope, and Method of the Sur·,ey. 
V. Presentation of the Report and Recommenc1.ations. 
Vi. Considert..tic.n cf the Legislatc.,rs' Views of the Proposals. 






I. Motives and Success. To undertake a scheme of reorganization with any 
other motive than that of procuring improved public administration, seems to be a 
/· virtual guarantee of negligible results. As Bosworth sa} s , to merely "get into the 
act" and set up a reorganization plan simply because other states are doing it seems 






Similarly, the use of reorganization commissions in an attempt to "take the 
neat off" an embarrassed administration not only appears to insure the failure of 
the move, but seems to tend to undermine the public's confidence in any future, sin-
cere, attempt to obtain better public management. 
What seems to be necessary is a group of responsible state political leaders 
with sincere good faith in trying t<;> get improved administration of the state's affairs . 
.iuch a group has the necessary public contacts and influence to give the reform the 
popular support it needs for passage. At the same time, it can present the leaders 
with the not necessarily incongruous opportunity to advance their own careers and 
further the desires of their constituents. 
It might be well to add here that the pure economy motive seems to have !al-
.en into disrepute. In the first place, state tax systems do not seem to hurt large 
md politically significant groups - as docs, say, the national income tax or the lo-
:al property tax. A point perhaps even more important is that there seem to exist 
·..._ 10 guarantees that administrative reorganizations will necessarily result in tangible 
nonetary savings. It is difficult, if not impossible, to measure, for example, the 
. 
' ~fficiency of a reorganized public health service in terms of dollars and cents . 
11. Sponsorship and Success. As Bosworth points out, the perfect hypothetical 
, ,· ,ituation is one in which the reorganization re.forn1 is sponsored by the "out" party, 
.. •. 
which manages to win the succeeding election and become the "ins 11 , and then proceed 
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to put into effect the reorganization plan which they had sponsored. It is regret-
..... 
J 
table that reorganization never seems to come Gff.'in quite this prescribed manner -
at least, we have no record of any states in which this pattern came to pass. 
-. 
It is equally regrettable, perhaps, that there seems to be; no prescribed pat-
· , tern of sponsor ship which seems to insure the adoption of reorganization plans. 
S·ubernatorial sponsorship, for instances, seems to lead to success in the South, 
while legislative sponsorship - on the surface a seemingly sure fire way to success 
- ttas been fruitful on only three occasions. Citizens 1 or taxpayers 1 groups seem to 
[:' have some success, especially when they act a co-sponsors with the governor or 
,. :he legislature. 
-.. 
'-f 
3 ponsorship by party leaders is virtually unknown - a not unexpected situation 
when one considers that a person in the game finds changes in the rules usually 
:nore of a hinderance than a help. Professional politicians really cannot be expect-
ed to give warm-hearted endorsement to the neat arranging of hierarchies of what 
Bosworth has called "decision points. " Only those politicians who are confident 
t:P,at they can use the new hierarchy will support the reorganization move, so, in the 
!inal analysis, the most that one can reasonable seem to expect is short run sponsor-
ihip of compromises in long run organizational plans on the part of party kaders. 
lll. Composition and Organization of the Corr,mission. The personnel of a re-
,rganization commission can, it is sad to say, have had as much to do with the adop-
ion or rejection of the recommended reorganization as can the merits of the plan 
tself. Because of this fact, it is of the utmost importance that the personnel on 
'.1e commission be of very high general prestige, and active political influence. As 
















lc::gislature, and how effectively can they rally popular support? 11 
Following in importance would be the proper political balancing of the mem-
bers of the commission to the end that it would not be guilty of being considered 
representative of any narrow groups of the state's range of public opinion. 
With these primary strategic matters taken care of, one can then turn his 
attention to matters of a tactical nature. For example, legislative members may 
be included in the membership of the commission, in the hope that they would, thus, 
both become committed to the recommendations and better able to explain them to 
their colleagues. There is a possible source of danger here, cf course. There is 
:i.lways the danger that the r'Corganizer may be really training his own opposition, 
plus the fact that since legislative members are subject to election, the men that 
l.re chosen are in danger of not having legislative status when the time comes for 
them to do their reorgnization chores. 
The device of giving the governor the power to appoint one or more members to 











;xtent, and, at the same time, serves to let him establish a channel of information 
10th to and from the commission, which may help in heading off proposals to which 
he chief executive is actively hes tile. 
On a more general plane, it may be assumed that the most desirous members 
re those who are exceedingly wdl-informed on both the r:;xisting organization of 
:1e state's administration, and the chances of politic2.l success of possible proposals. 
; may be safely assumed that the group to which primary importance has already 
-een attached would meet these standards, but from a more specific point of view 








it might be mentioned that such persons as ex-governors and members of Congress, 
if their general reputation has not been too badly smirched, or have not made too 
many political enemies may serve as a personnel pool which could materially aid 
a reorganization commission by virtu~ of their personal experiences . 
Such routine considerations of a personal nature as their conduct in the con-
ference situMion, and drafting and writing ability may be taken into account. But, 
it should be repeated that the primary need appears to be prestige and influence and 
the careful avoiclance of giving cause for attack on the whole group because of poli-




Size cloes not seem to be a consideration of any importance. Bosworth 
indicates that the corn:l;Diaiom he surveyed ranged from " ... four to forty-one mem-
8/ 
bers, with each extreme having som€! success in adoptions. " There is, it is true, 
~ · a very real risk of unreprescntativeness in the smaller groups, but size, per se, 
. 
I 
seems a trivial factor. 
The use of advisory committees would, it appears from the results, be a de-
.t vice that merits the most serious consideration. In New Hampshire and Oregon, 
the advisory committee was used with excellent results - although the use of the 
device in the case of Minnesota was not accompanied by any significant adoptions. 
Bosworth I s estimate is that 11 ••• the advisory committee was not a decisive factor 
9/ 
in ... success; rather, it was one of several important contributing factors. 11 
IV. Organization, Scope and Method. The prevailing fashion in reorganization 
seems to decree that the survey cover as large an area as is possible with the 
available funds and powers. In view of the facts that many states' structures are 
8/ Idem. 
9/ Ibid., p. 92. -30-
:, 
really in need of extensive reorganization, and that the reorganizers naturally 
-< 







what to be expected. The question that arises, however, is this; does a reorgani-
zation plan requiring both numerous and important changes impair the chances of 
achieving ~change? 
The answer seem tc be in the affirmative .. 
For example, in all states, save Delaware, in which the legislative response 
was negative, the reorganizers had included provisions which required amending 
the constitution. Such a reccrd as this raises seious doubts as to whether admin-
istrative reorganization commissions should concern themselves with the state 
constitution. Alo~, this general line, it appears that it would well behcove com-
missions to severely restrict themselves to the scope cf th0 survey understood by 
> · the authorizing body. As Bosworth puts it, "Reorganization movements hav_e 
10/ 
sufficient hazards without raising the question of the legitimacy of the progeny. 11 
Insofar as the organization of the survey is concerned the trend seems to be 
definitely away from turning the jub over tc"J a national consulting firm. The reas-
ons for this seem to condense to three:: 
1. Possible lack of opportunity for th~ commission to pa,rticipate with a re-
sulting lower level of understanc1.ing cf the recommendations and ability to 
communicate them effectively when the time ce;mcs for justifying them. 
2. The national firm may easily CNcrlock kcal -::ra<litic:ns and values and 
fail to account for commun differences on critical pcints of state politics. 
3. The danger cf cr1.::ating e;ppusiticn by the use of "foreigners. " 
A device more to be preferred than using national organizaticns - but one 



















researcher as director of the survey who has had some experience in the state and 
who has a generally favorable reputation. Bosworth points out that eleven of the 
fourteen states with more or less favorable adoption results used some variation 
of such a scheme. 
Among the factors ·which appear to have little if any effect on the success of 
state reorganization plans are the following: 
1. The use of 11 task forces I such as were employed by the national 
Hoover Commission, 
2. The use of specialists for surveys in their special fields of com-
petence. 
3. The widespread use of generalists . 
4. The amount of data collected - assuming that it is net merely a 
sketchy coverage. As a matter of fact, collecticn of vast amounts of 
detailed data seem to be distincly inadvisable. 
The problem cf whether to devote attention to minor or mocerate proposals in 
addition to major recommendations se(;ms to be a moot point. Among the argu-
ments against their inclusion is the feeling that adding anything to the major sug-
gestions serves only to detract from the primary aims. On the other hand, to ir .. • 
elude them frequently aids in getting the groundwork laid for eliciting a positive 
response from the legislature - it is something that helps to "get the ball rolling, 11 
as it were. Another consideration is that including proposals of lesser significance 
there seems to be a better chance of obtaining some adcpticns. The motive here 
is twofold; the adoptions give a morale boost to the participants in the reorganiza-
tion attempt, and by getting something on the books future attempts are not pre-
judices by having to overcome the past history of an utter fiasco. 
V. Presentation of the Report. There appear to be two major considerations 








The two are not completely unrelated; the first revolves around the attempts to 
influence the politically powerful people of the state, and the second concerns tht! 
attempt to create interest among. the people of the state as a whole . 
The first must take intc consideraticn keeping the governor informed and 
"happy," as well as the agency personnel who arc to become "casualties" in the 
reorganization plan - if, indeed, thi1;1 can be managed. Considerations earlier 
presented under the heading of "Sponsorship" anj "Composition" will, cf course, 
if properly attended to, greatly forestall difficulties in this area. 
The campaign to stimulate public interest is a more complicated problem. 
For example, it seems in.advisable t0 fellow the leacl of some states and to pro-
vide for the submission of only one repcrt and the dissolution cf the commission 
upon the submission of that report. At the other extreme, and see1ningly equally 
inadvisable, is the case cf Michigan, where there were thirty reports - spread 
out ever a two-year period - with three planned press releases for each indivi-
dual report. Neither of these approaches furnished very much in the w2.y of a 
sensible way to stimuL:tte pubiic interest. 
Bosworth's suggestion is certainly mere reasonable and probably more fruit-
< 





about two weeks has proved an effective w&y of getting large amounts d publicity 
11/ 
and of producing public discussion ... "-
The question cf the desirability cf having the commission work in secrecy 
must be considered. The answer arrived at will be in terms of whether the dan-
ger pressure activities upon commissioners - as news c.f their views becomes 
public - is considered tc be greater than the ch2.nce of heading off future troubles. 
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The possibility that cpen deliberations may give time for the opposition to form 
seems tc, be counteracted by the very real chance that, in the long run, they may 
as easily damage their case as hdp it. 
If a concentrated campaign for public backing is to be established, it would 
seem that the matter of timing is very impcrtant. All too frequently, reorganiza-
tion reports are submitted just at the beginning cf the legislative session - or after 
they have been under way for some time. In either case, it is easy for them to be 
buried in the welter of controversial issues which someh:.:;w always seem to man-
age to appear at session time. A perfectionist desire on the part of the reorgani-
zer is sometimes seen here which in effect sacrifices chancee fer adopticn in 
favor of prose perfection or rechecking of footn0tes. Adequate time for pubiic 
consideration is the sine qua ~ of the campaign for public support. 
The actual form of the repc:.::t can, of course, either help or hinder its 
chances of obtaining public approval. While it is certainly not advisable t:o v,ater 
the report down in order to make it into a best seller, a careful approad: cari re-
move the mere objectionable features of "administrative report" style and what 
too often passes for "scholarly'' organization. 
New Hampshire seems to have had goc:l results with open-forurn MF~cCngs -
preceeded by a one-day seminar session at the University to familiarb:E :;•orne of 
the people who were later to participate in forum discussions with the reorganiza-
tion scheme. 
It would be well to note here that the people who generally direct surveys 
have what Bosworth has kindly called, " ... disabilities for lea,ling mass political 
lZ/ 
action." Legislative council directors, university bureaus of research are 
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The possibility that cpen deliberations may give time for the opposition to form 
seems to be counteracted by the very real chance that, in the long run, tht:y may 
as easily damage their case as hdp it . 
If a concentrated campaign for public backing is tc be established, it would 
seem that the matter of timing is very important. All tco frequently, reorganiza-
tion reports are submitted just at the beginning cf the legislative session - or after 
they have been under way for some time. In either case, it is easy for them to be 
buried in the welter of controversial issues which someh:.:;w always seem tu man-
age to appear at session time. A perfectionist desire on the part of the reorgani-
zer is sometimes seen here which in effect sacrifices chances for adopticn in 
favor of prose perfection er rechecking of footnotes. Adequate time for pubiic 
consideration is the sine qua ~ of the campaign for public support. 
The actual form of the repc:ct can, of course, either help or hinder its 
chances of obtaining public approval. While it is certainly not advisable t:o water 
the report down in order to make it into a best seller, a careful approacb can re-
move the mere objectionable features of "administrative report" style and what 
too often passes for "scholarly'' organization. 
New Hampshire seems to have had goc:l results with open-forurn MF~cCngs -
preceeded by a one-day seminar session at the University to familiari.zE :,•orne of 
the people who were later to participate in forum discussions with the reorganiza-
tion scheme. 
It would be well to note here that the people who generally direct surveys 
have what Bosworth has kindly called, 11 ••• disabilities for lea,ling mass political 
12/ 
action. " Legislative council directors, university bureaus of research are 
Y:._/ lbid.,p. 96 . 
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examples of the case in point; they usually, and for excellent reasons, are poli-
tically neutral - and wish to stay that way. Heads of taxpayer or citizens associ-
ations are a general exception to this rule, and, as a result, may be better quali-
fiecl to aid in the campaign to push the survey through to adoption. 
It is perhaps regretable - although not too surprising - that the device used 
in the case of the national Hoover Commission of allowing the executive to submit 
reorganization plans to the legislature for "veto" has been little used in the states. 
These plans go into effect if the legislature fails to act against them, and such a 
13/ 
device, which puts" ... inertia and indecision of the side of change ... "-would ap-
pear to help the chances of adoption of the recommendations. It should be mention-
ed that one reason for its not being used by the states is the very real fear in many 
jurisdictions that it would be unconstitutional. 
A final consideration which seems tc merit thought is one concerning the use 
of some provision to keep reorganization movements in existence so that the pro-
/· posals may get mere than one hearing. From the internal point of view, this can 
.1_ , 
,. 




be done by a vigorous governor, or by the appointment of an interim committee of 
th<:: legislature to give further attention to the plan. Other alternatives are to as-
sign the task to the legislative council, or, even, to continue the commission in 
existence - if its reputation is still relatively clean - and allow it to act as a 
source of stimulus for further reorganization measures. 
Existing civic groups furnish a ready-made source of continuity and these can 
easily be supplemented by citizens' committees such as were established after the 
Hoover Commission report. The danger of such groups being labeled as special 








indicate that they do accomplish some thing - over and above the educational bene-
fits which such a type of organization is apt to confer upon. the community. 
VI. Consideration of Legislators' Views. While the persons who generally 
conduct reorganization surveys seem tc be prt:tty much in agreement on the funda-
mentals to be sought in reorganization, it is important te, note that there is not so 
much agreement on· these concepts arncng legislatcrs. 
What is really in conflict here, of course, are on the one hand, the assump-
tions of the reorganizers, and on the other, the basic premises of some of the 
legislators - and differtnce in assumptions cannot be logically reconciled; some 
one has to give some ground. In this case, it seems obvious that the burden for 
changing lies not with the legislator but with the would-be reorganizer. 
Bosworth has summed up the matter very well. Here is 
11 
••• an opportunity to try to find the accommodations 
to ... various values which can. be arrived at currently in en-
actable measur(;s. What is arrived at in reorganization pro-
posals may not be neat in pattern and may look te,ward both 
integration and particularism, but if the conditions develop-
ing professional administration are bettered, that is much 14/ 
to be preferred to having copies of a rejected 'model' report." 
No discussion of the required ingredients for a successful reorganization 
plan omit this vital point . 
"Some improvement today - the chance for some more tomorrow'' is an in-
finiuitely better slogan fer the reorganizer than "all or nothing." 
Reorganization is a political process, and, as such, it cannot leave out the 
art of compromise - the essential ingredient of dem0cratic government. 
14/ Ibid., p. 99 
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